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Denying and Defining Religion Under the First 
Amendment: Waldorf Education as a Lens for 
Advocating a Broad Definitional Approach 
INTRODUCTION 
Group eurhythmic dance, biodynamic gardening, handicrafts, 
and the search for spiritual enlightenment are not the typical 
subjects that elementary and high school students learn in the 
classroom. Nevertheless, these topics and others make up a 
particular nontraditional curriculum that many parents choose for 
their children.1 This pedagogical method, which focuses on 
fostering students’ mental, physical, and spiritual health, is 
practiced as part of the phenomenon known as Waldorf education.2 
Waldorf schools originated from a belief system known as 
anthroposophy, which author and spiritual philosopher Rudolf 
Steiner created in the early twentieth century.3 Anthroposophy 
postulates, among other ideas, the existence of a directly 
comprehensible spiritual world and embraces teachings from all 
religious faiths.4 Notably, Waldorf education, although most 
commonly implemented in private institutions, also exists in 
publicly funded settings.5 
Although many parents, teachers, administrators, and students 
commend the holistic, artistic approach undertaken by public 
Waldorf education, a group consisting of parents of former 
Waldorf students and certain taxpayers is not so supportive.6 In 
fact, this group is the plaintiff in a lawsuit, which alleges that 
publicly funded Waldorf education is religious in nature7 and thus 
violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.8 
Representatives and supporters of Waldorf schools, as well as 
followers of anthroposophy, forcefully deny this accusation, 
asserting that anthroposophy is merely a spiritual philosophy—not 
a religion.9 Thus, what actually qualifies as a religion under the 
Constitution is central to the resolution of this dispute. Whereas a 
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significant line of cases addresses the issue of defining religion 
when a group claims or admits religious status, the Waldorf 
controversy provides the uncommon situation in which an entity 
denies religiosity.10  
The characteristics of the Waldorf paradigm engender interests, 
arguments, and legal questions distinct from those germane to the 
more commonly litigated Free Exercise and Establishment Clause 
fact patterns.11 Specifically, the stakes involved when an entity 
asserts or admits its religious nature differ significantly from the 
individual and societal concerns in the less common situation in 
which a party denies its religious nature.12 Accordingly, these 
dissimilarities in interests raise the question of whether a court has 
the authority to label a party as religious against its will. Further, 
these dissimilarities shed light on how courts should define 
religion.  
Moreover, contemporary notions of American religious 
diversity demand an examination of the legal definition of religion 
and suggest that controversies like the Waldorf dispute will appear 
in the future in greater numbers and with greater frequency. Such 
disputes will likely increase as religious subgroups and even 
completely novel religious groups emerge and seek to establish 
themselves in the United States.13 Not only do non-Christian 
minority religions represent an increasingly large percentage of the 
American population, but subgroups within these minority 
traditions as well as within Christianity are also multiplying.14 
Furthermore, in light of the perceived failure of many traditional 
public schools in the United States,15 parents’ and communities’ 
                                                                                                             
 10. See Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 200 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., 
concurring); see also infra note 82. 
 11. See supra note 8. The first clause of the quoted portion of the 
amendment is the Establishment Clause; the second is the Free Exercise Clause. 
 12. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 13. See infra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 15. See, e.g., John Stossel, John Stossel’s “Stupid in America,” How Lack 
of Choice Cheats Our Kids Out of a Good Education, ABC NEWS, Jan. 13, 2006, 
http://abcnews.go.com/2020/Stossel/story?id=1500338; Lou Dobbs, Dobbs: No 
Summer Vacation for Our Failing Schools, CNN, June 27, 2006, http:// 
articles.cnn.com/2006-06-27/us/dobbs.june28_1_high-school-diploma-dropouts-
graduation-numbers?_s=PM:US; Gilbert Cruz, Can Charter-School Execs Help 
Failing Public Schools?, TIME, June 27, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/ 
nation/article/0,8599,1907203,00.html; Valerie Strauss, An Occasion for Civil 
Debate, Constitution Day Questioned as a ‘One-Shot Moment’ in Education, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2008, at B02; Robin Finn, Shaping the System That 
Grades City Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2007, at 4; Mitchell Landsberg, The 
Vanishing Class; Back to Basics: Why Does High School Fail So Many?, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at A1. 




confidence in non-traditional education is on the rise.16 Where non-
traditional educational models arising from arguably religious 
organizations seek direct financial support from the state, the 
potential for Waldorf-like controversies abounds, indicating the 
need for a coherent, workable constitutional definition of religion.  
In light of the increasingly diverse religious and educational 
landscapes in the United States, this Comment contends that the 
Waldorf dispute demonstrates why courts should adopt a broad, 
unitary definition and be able to apply it in spite of an entity’s 
denial of religiosity. Specifically, courts should adopt a definition 
that does not apply a “comprehensiveness” requirement but does 
incorporate an element focusing on “duties of conscience” in the 
mind of an adherent to a belief.17  
In reaching this conclusion, Part I of this Comment first 
explores the history and current status of anthroposophy, as well as 
the Waldorf education program to which Steiner’s philosophy 
gives rise. Additionally, Part I examines the Waldorf controversy 
in some detail. Next, Part II tracks the jurisprudential development 
of the constitutional definition of religion and discusses the 
essential failure of the United States Supreme Court in setting forth 
a clear, workable definition. Part III distills from past judicial 
decisions and scholarly commentary the underlying individual and 
societal interests that drive the debate about defining religion in 
typically observed cases. Part IV explores how the facts of the 
Waldorf dispute bring to light interests that have not arisen in 
previously decided cases. Ultimately concluding that societal 
concerns outweigh individual concerns in the Waldorf scenario, 
Part IV also suggests that courts have the authority to impose a 
religious label on an entity that denies its own religiosity. Finally, 
acknowledging that the Waldorf scenario implicates a need for a 
new definitional framework, Part V presents a forward-looking 
solution: an expansive, inclusive definition of religion that 
adequately protects the interests entailed in both the Free Exercise 
and Establishment Clauses by reflecting the role of religion in a 
pluralistic society.  
 
                                                                                                             
 16. See, e.g., V. Dion Haynes, Teachers, Parents Spend Break Getting New 
School Ready for Kids, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 5, 1994, at 2; Kate Folmar, Opposites on 
Track, 2 Schools in Running for National Blue Ribbon Status, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 
12, 1997, at 1; Abby Goodnough, $30 Million Pledged to Help City Revamp 
Failing Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at B6; Kameel Stanley, Putting His 
Ideals to the Test, School to Focus on Founder’s ‘Smaller Is Better’ Doctrine, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2008, at LZ01; Rachel Cromidas, Charter Education 
Expanding In Chicago, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2010, at 21A. 
 17. See discussion infra Part V. 




I. EXAMINING ANTHROPOSOPHY AND WALDORF EDUCATION 
A. Anthroposophy 
Anthroposophy, a spiritual philosophy founded by author and 
teacher Rudolf Steiner in the early twentieth century, advances the 
notion of an objective, comprehensible spiritual world, amenable 
to direct experience through internal spiritual cultivation.18 
Operating as a method of spiritual study that combines elements of 
anthropology and theosophy, anthroposophy aims to attain the 
precision, consistency, and coherence characteristic of scientific 
investigations of the physical world.19 
Particularly, anthroposophy endeavors to observe “the external 
nature of the human being living in the sense-perceptible world,” 
but in doing so, “seek[s] out the spiritual foundation by means of 
its manifestation.”20 The end aim of anthroposophy is to empower 
people “to penetrate the mystery of [their] relationship with the 
spiritual world by searching for answers and insights that come 
through a schooling of one’s inner life.”21 Ultimately, 
anthroposophy may be termed succinctly as “spiritual science.”22 
Today, over 10,000 institutions worldwide are fundamentally 
based on or connected with Steiner’s anthroposophy.23 
                                                                                                             
 18. See generally RUDOLF STEINER, THE ESSENTIAL STEINER: BASIC 
WRITINGS OF RUDOLF STEINER: KNOWLEDGE, NATURE, AND SPIRIT; SPIRITUAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY; HISTORICAL VISION; ESOTERIC CHRISTIANITY; SOCIETY AND 
EDUCATION (Robert A. McDermott ed., 1985). 
 19. Anthropology is defined as “the study of human beings and their 
ancestors through time and space and in relation to physical character, 
environmental and social relations, and culture.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003). Theosophy is defined as a “teaching 
about God and the world based on mystical insight.” Id. 
 20. RUDOLF STEINER, ANTHROPOSOPHY (A FRAGMENT) 84–85 (Catherine E. 
Creeger & Detlef Hardorp trans., 1996). Steiner provided a vivid analogy to 
describe anthroposophy: 
If theosophy could be likened to standing on top of a mountain 
surveying the landscape, while anthropology is investigating down in 
the lowlands, forest by forest and house by house, then anthroposophy 
will choose its vantage point on the slope of the mountain, where 
individual details can still be differentiated but integrate themselves to 
form a whole.  
Id. 
 21. The Anthrposophical Society in America, ANTHROPOSOPHY.ORG, 
http://www.anthroposophy.org/about/about-the-anthroposophical-society.html 
(last visited on Feb. 26, 2012). 
 22. Is Anthroposophy a Religious Faith?, WALDORFANSWERS.ORG, 
http://www.waldorfanswers.org/NotReligion2.htm (last visited April 28, 2012). 
 23. History of the Anthroposophical Society, GOETHEANUM, http://www. 
goetheanum.org/121.html?&L=1 (last visited April 28, 2012). 




B. Waldorf Education 
Waldorf schools are a product of Steiner’s anthroposophy and 
have become increasingly popular internationally, with 2,500 
schools in over 60 countries.24 Like Montessori schools and other 
non-traditional educational paradigms, Waldorf schools offer a 
different approach to education—one that subscribes to 
anthroposophy’s inward-looking, free-thinking perspective.25 
Indeed, in order “to solve the riddles of existence and to transform 
both self and society,” the Waldorf curriculum differs significantly 
from other educational plans.26 For example, students in Waldorf 
elementary schools do not learn to read until the second grade—
much later than their traditional school counterparts.27  
Other examples of Waldorf schools’ distinction from other 
schools include strong focuses on expressive dance—termed 
“eurhythmy”—artistic development, handwork, crafts, gardening, 
natural studies, cooking arts, and storytelling.28 Many of the 
history and storytelling components of the Waldorf curriculum 
involve the study of holy texts, myths, and creeds from a panoply 
of world religions.29 Additionally, with respect to faculty, those 
aspiring to teach at Waldorf schools must undergo an extensive 
training program in anthroposophy involving Steiner’s most 
prominent works.30 Notably, teachers of younger grades remain 
with the same students until the students’ eighth year in school.31  
                                                                                                             
 24. Waldorf Education, THE WALDORF SCHOOL OF GARDEN CITY, 
www.waldorfgarden.org/page.cfm?p=349 (last visited Jan. 24, 2012). 
 25. Adam Housley, Where’s Waldorf?, FOXNEWS LIVE SHOTS (September 
15, 2010, 11:21 AM), http://liveshots.blogs.foxnews.com/2010/09/15/wheres-
waldorf/?action=late-new&order.  
 26. The Anthroposophical Society in America, ANTHROPOSOPHY.ORG, supra 
note 21. 
 27. Frequently Asked Questions, WALDORFANSWERS.ORG, http://www. 
waldorfanswers.org/WaldorfFAQ.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2010). 
 28. RSC Foundations in Anthroposophy, ANTHROPOSOPHY.ORG, http:// 
www.anthroposophy.org/index.php?id=62&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=259&tx_ttnews
[backPid]=39&cHash=e6744ae40c487b197511023defdb5f0a (last visited Sept. 
8, 2010). 
 29. William Ward, Is Waldorf Education Christian?, WHY WALDORF 
WORKS, http://www.whywaldorfworks.org/02_W_Education/documents/2_Is_ 
W_Christian.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2010). 
 30. RSC Foundations in Anthroposophy, ANTHROPOSOPHY.ORG, supra note 
28. This website also describes the thirty-week program as a “gateway” into the 
“profound world-view” of anthroposophy:  
Each of us bears three essential questions in her/his heart: “Who am I? 
What is my relationship with others? Why am I here on the earth—
what is my mission?” . . . . 




C. The Constitutional Controversy Regarding Waldorf Education 
Most Waldorf schools in the United States are private.32 
However, to date, 43 are publicly funded—24 of which are in 
California.33 Thus, the issue of whether publicly funding Waldorf 
schools amounts to an establishment of religion—which is 
prohibited by the Establishment Clause—arises around Waldorf 
methods and their roots in Steiner’s anthroposophy.34 Although 
Waldorf supporters deny any religious or sectarian motive 
underlying the schools’ curricula,35 People for Legal and 
Nonsectarian Schools (PLANS), a group of concerned parents and 
taxpayers, opposes publicly funded Waldorf schools.36 PLANS not 
only attacks the quality of the teaching methods used in Waldorf 
                                                                                                             
 
Only by working with the whole human being—head, heart, and 
hands/limbs—can we find meaningful answers to such questions. 
“Abstract” knowledge serves only the head, not the heart and hands. 
The Foundations in Anthroposophy program balances and interweaves 
five educational approaches to self-transformation: study, conversation, 
meditation, artistic activity, and skill-development . . . . 
. . . . 
A gateway into many professions, the Foundations in Anthroposophy 
program serves as the first year of Waldorf Teacher Education for those 
who wish to become Waldorf school teachers in the Grades, Early 
Childhood and High School. It also prepares the student for further 
studies in Biodynamic agriculture and horticulture, beekeeping, 
remedial education, medicine, the arts of eurhythmy, drama, speech, 
painting, sculpture, music, architecture, and social sciences . . . . 
Students explore the nature of the human being as body, soul, and 
spirit, chart the unfolding of their own biographies, seek the deeper 
meaning of life, grasp the laws of karma and reincarnation, and strive 
to create new forms through practical work and community building. 
The Foundations in Anthroposophy program opens exciting vistas into 
the inner laws of nature and spirit, evolution of the Earth and changing 
human consciousness, the relationships between East and West, the 
mysteries of the Grail, freedom, love and individual creativity, and the 
challenges/opportunities facing us in our time . . . . 
Id. 
 31. Frequently Asked Questions, WALDORFANSWERS.ORG, supra note 27. 
 32. Housley, supra note 25.  
 33. Id.  
 34. For a law to pass muster under the Establishment Clause, the law must 
have a legitimate secular purpose, must not have the primary effect of advancing 
or inhibiting religion, and must not further an excessive entanglement of 
government and religion. If it does not pass this test, the law cannot stand. See 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 35. Frequently Asked Questions, WALDORFANSWERS.ORG, supra note 27. 
 36. Welcome from PLANS President, WALDORFCRITICS.ORG, http://www. 
waldorfcritics.org/index.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2010). 




classrooms but also objects to the alleged unconstitutionality of 
government funding for these schools.37 Specifically, PLANS 
argues that state support for Waldorf schools directly violates the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because these 
schools are inherently “religious” and deleterious to the separation 
of church and state.38 Accordingly, PLANS sued two California 
school districts for their official support of Waldorf schools.39 
The crux of PLANS’s argument rests in defining 
anthroposophy—and Waldorf schools, by extension—as religious 
in nature. In its trial brief, PLANS aims to establish the religious 
nature of anthroposophy by linking Waldorf schools to the 
teachings of Steiner and anthroposophy.40 In doing so, PLANS 
aims to show that Waldorf schools constitute “an excessive 
governmental entanglement” with religion.41 Furthermore, PLANS 
insists that public funding for Waldorf schools is a government 
endorsement of religion.42 
Other instances of Waldorf schools’ arguably religious nature 
are scattered throughout Steiner’s teachings. For example, Steiner 
is alleged to have made missionaries of aspiring Waldorf teachers 
by instructing them to promote the anthroposophist message to 
their students.43 Additionally, Steiner himself specifically referred 
to anthroposophy as religious: “[T]he [Anthroposophical] Society 
provides religious instruction just as other religious groups do.”44 
From her own experience as a parent of a former student, the 
President of PLANS describes Waldorf education as a rigid, 
                                                                                                             
 37. Melody Gutierrez, Public Waldorf Schools Booming in Sacramento–But 
Are They Legal?, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 2, 2010, at 1B.  
 38. Concerns, WALDORFCRITICS.ORG, http://www.waldorfcritics.org/concerns 
.html#public (last visited Feb. 26, 2012). 
 39. Trial Brief for Plaintiff at 1, PLANS, Inc. v. Sacramento City Unified 
Sch. Dist., Twin Ridges Elementary Sch. Dist., and Does 1–100, 2005 WL 
2657536 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (No. CIV. S 98–266 FCD EFB). 
 40. Id. at 5–6. 
 41. Id. at 5. 
 42. Id. at 11–12. 
 43. RUDOLF STEINER, FACULTY MEETINGS WITH RUDOLF STEINER 55 
(Robert Lathe & Nancy Parsons Whittaker trans., 1998). Steiner emphasized: 
Among the faculty, we must certainly carry within us the knowledge 
that we are not here for our own sakes, but to carry out the divine 
cosmic plan. We should always remember that when we do something, 
we are actually carrying out the intentions of the gods, that we are, in a 
certain sense, the means by which that streaming down from above will 
go out into the world. 
Id. 
 44. Id. at 706. 




authoritarian environment immersed in “medieval dogma.”45 
Moreover, PLANS criticizes the alleged religious nature of the 
material taught in class.46 For example, PLANS emphasizes the in-
class celebration of the religious festivals of Michaelmas47 and the 
Advent Spiral,48 although Waldorf teachers often change the 
names of these festivals.49 
Waldorf supporters, however, characterize the PLANS 
argument as a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of 
Waldorf schools and anthroposophy.50 Although religious study is 
often incorporated into a Waldorf school’s curriculum, Waldorf 
supporters assert that anthroposophy is not mentioned in the 
classroom, that in-class religious study does not favor any 
particular religion, and that such study is aimed at providing 
natural spiritual growth for students of all faiths.51 Rather than 
                                                                                                             
 45. Welcome, WALDORFCRITICS.ORG, http://www.waldorfcritics.org (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2012). The PLANS president is Debra Snell. Id. 
 46. See Concerns, WALDORFCRITICS.ORG, supra note 38. Specifically, 
PLANS attacks the alleged religious nature of the class material: 
Since 1991 the Waldorf movement has begun to move into public 
education in the US [sic] with teacher training workshops, “Waldorf 
Method” magnet schools, and “Waldorf-inspired” charter schools . . . . 
[T]hese activities have led to violations of church-state separation laws. 
The religious philosophy of Anthroposophy cannot be separated from 
Waldorf education. For example, Steiner’s scheme of “post-Atlantean 
sub-races” is the framework of ancient history taught in all Waldorf 
schools, both public and private. 
Id. 
 47. Michaelmas is the Christian celebratory feast of the victory of Michael 
the Archangel over Lucifer. See RICHARD FREEMAN JOHNSON, SAINT MICHAEL 
THE ARCHANGEL IN MEDIEVAL ENGLISH LEGEND 105–06 (2005). 
 48. Also called “Winter Garden” or “Advent Garden,” Advent Spiral is a 
Waldorf school event that resembles a mystical or religious ritual. See Concerns, 
WALDORFCRITICS.ORG, supra note 38. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Frequently Asked Questions, WALDORFANSWERS.ORG, supra note 27. 
 51. Id. Waldorf supporters are emphatic in their stance concerning the 
religion-neutral nature of Waldorf schools: 
Are Waldorf schools religious? Waldorf schools are non-sectarian and 
non-denominational. They educate all children, regardless of their 
cultural or religious backgrounds. The pedagogical method is 
comprehensive, and, as part of its task, seeks to bring about recognition 
and understanding of all the world cultures and religions. Waldorf 
schools are not part of any church. They espouse no particular religious 
doctrine but are based on a belief that there is a spiritual dimension to 
the human being and to all of life. Waldorf families come from a broad 
spectrum of religious traditions and interest. 
Waldorf Education Frequently Asked Questions, WHY WALDORF WORKS, 
http://www.whywaldorfworks.org/02_W_Education/faq_about.asp (last visited 
Sept. 8, 2010). 




adopting the label “religion,” Waldorf supporters and 
anthroposophists see anthroposophy as a complement to religion.52 
Anthroposophists claim to embrace ideas from all religions and 
focus on spiritual enlightenment.53 Anthroposophy entails no 
profession of faith, no sacred texts, no particular method of study, 
no proclaimed means of salvation, no religious practices or 
sacraments, and no hierarchical spiritual leaders.54 Some Waldorf 
supporters even claim that Steiner’s spiritual philosophy cannot be 
characterized as a belief system, but should merely be considered a 
method of achieving a healthy body, mind, and spirit. 55 
Ultimately, the dispute can be characterized as Waldorf 
supporters’ word against the allegations of PLANS. But whose 
point of view, if either, is the correct one?56 Centering on delicate 
issues of faith, education, and the role of religion in American 
society, the implications of the Waldorf scenario provide a lens for 
examining two exceptionally difficult issues: whether a court has 
the authority to impose a religious label on an unwilling entity, and 
if so, how courts should define religion under the First 
Amendment.  
II. TRACKING THE JURISPRUDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
DEFINITION OF RELIGION 
Despite the significance of the Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses of the Constitution, defining religion remains a herculean 
task that the United States Supreme Court has essentially avoided 
to date. The Supreme Court’s failure to provide a working legal 
                                                                                                             
 52. Is Anthroposophy a Religion?, WALDORFANSWERS.ORG, http://www. 
waldorfanswers.org/NotReligion1.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2012). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Is Anthroposophy a Religious Faith?, WALDORFANSWERS.ORG, supra 
note 22. Steiner’s own commentary distinguishes anthroposophy from religion: 
It is often asked how spiritual science or anthroposophy stands in 
relation to the religious life of man . . . . By reason of the whole 
character of anthroposophy, it will not intervene in any religious creed, 
in the sphere of any sort of religious life . . . . Spiritual science never 
can entertain the wish to create a religion . . . . One cannot, therefore, 
call spiritual science, as such, a religious faith. It neither aims at 
creating a religious faith nor in any way at changing a person in relation 
to his religious beliefs. 
Id. 
 56. In the most recent episode of this lawsuit, the Eastern District ruled in 
favor of the defendant school districts, holding that PLANS failed to show that 
anthroposophy is religious in nature. Memorandum and Order at 21, PLANS, 
Inc. v. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., et al., 2010 WL 6352637 (E.D. Cal. 
Nov. 5, 2010) (No. CIV. S 98–266 FCD EFB). 




definition of religion has engendered pervasive uncertainty with 
respect to the issue, prompting lower courts and legal scholars to 
set forth several definitional approaches.57  
A. An Evolving Definition: From a Theistic Approach to Ultimate 
Concerns 
Although Supreme Court jurisprudence associated with the 
constitutional definition of religion is sparse, judicial opinions on 
the issue have shifted from adopting a strict, narrow definition of 
religion to a sweepingly inclusive definition.58 The history of the 
American judicial definition of religion began in 1890 with the 
case of Davis v. Beason.59 There, the Supreme Court stated that 
“[t]he term ‘religion’ has reference to one’s views of his relations 
to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for 
his being and character, and of obedience to his will.”60 This 
theistic, creator-centric definition of religion lasted well into the 
early twentieth century, when the Court in United States v. 
Macintosh defined the “essence of religion” as a “belief in a 
relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any 
human relation.”61  
The first challenge to the predominating theistic definition of 
religion originated in Judge Augustus Hand’s appellate court 
opinion in United States v. Kauten.62 Rather than adopting a 
theistic approach, Judge Hand broadly defined religion as “a belief 
finding expression in a conscience which categorically requires the 
believer to disregard elementary self-interest and to accept 
martyrdom in preference to transgressing its tenets.”63 In other 
words, Judge Hand developed a definition of religion rooted not 
only in a single supernatural paradigm but also in human 
relationships and the universe at large.64 Only a year later, in 
United States v. Ballard, the Supreme Court embraced Judge 
Hand’s approach, defining religion to encompass “theories of life 
and of death and of the hereafter which are rank heresy to 
followers of the orthodox faiths.”65  
                                                                                                             
 57. See discussion infra Parts III–IV. 
 58. See infra notes 59–76 and accompanying text. 
 59. 133 U.S. 333 (1890). 
 60. Id. at 342. 
 61. 283 U.S. 605, 633–34 (1931). 
 62. 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943). 
 63. Id. at 708. 
 64. Karen Sandrik, Towards a Modern Definition of Religion, 85 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 561, 565 (2008). 
 65. 322 U.S. 78, 86–87 (1944). 




Accordingly, this jurisprudential progression set the foundation 
for a more significant broadening of the definition of religion in 
the 1960s. In Torcaso v. Watkins, the Court adopted an approach to 
defining religion that transcended the confines of a theistic 
definition of religion: “neither [the federal or state government] 
can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as 
against those religions founded on different beliefs.”66 The Court 
even suggested in dicta that non-theistic beliefs like “Buddhism, 
Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism, and others” fall 
within the definition of religion.67  
Subsequently, in interpreting section 6(j) of the Universal 
Military Training and Service Act of 1948,68 the Court developed 
the “ultimate concerns” test for defining religion in United States 
v. Seeger69 and Welsh v. United States.70 The ultimate concerns 
test, which arises in the conscientious objector context, essentially 
consists of one dispositive question to determine whether a person 
is a conscientious objector exempt from military service: “[D]oes 
the claimed belief occupy the same place in the life of the objector 
as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one clearly 
qualified for the exemption?”71 Answering this question and 
granting the conscientious objections in Seeger and Welsh, the 
Court analyzed two sub-issues: “whether the beliefs professed by a 
registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in [the 
objector’s] own scheme of things, religious.”72 The sincerity 
inquiry is fact-dependent and determined on a case-by-case basis.73 
Notably, the inquiry strictly avoids an examination of whether the 
alleged religious beliefs are valid.74 The second part of the test, 
however, determines whether the beliefs at issue are universally 
important in the life of the objector, such that they “play the role of 
a religion and function as a religion.”75 Put differently, the test 
                                                                                                             
 66. 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961). 
 67. Id. at 495 n.11. 
 68. 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1970). Section 6(j) allows exemptions from 
military combat training and service by way of an objection rooted in “religious 
training and belief.” Id. The concurrences in Seeger and Welsh suggest that the 
Constitution was an influence on the Court’s statutory interpretation because the 
Court went beyond the plain language of the statute. See Ben Clements, Note, 
Defining “Religion” in the First Amendment: A Functional Approach, 74 
CORNELL L. REV. 532, 538 (1989). 
 69. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
 70. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
 71. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 184. 
 72. Id. at 185. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 184. 
 75. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 339. 




does not examine the content of the belief at issue but instead aims 
to determine whether a belief is subjectively identifiable in the 
eyes of an adherent as an ultimate, gravely significant concern.76 
B. Seeking a Better Approach to Define Religion: Malnak v. Yogi 
Torcaso, Seeger, and Welsh, taken together, demonstrate a 
modern broadening of the judicial definition of religion beyond the 
traditional theistic approach, which centers on man’s relationship 
with a creator.77 Specifically, this broadening is characterized as a 
“functional” approach, which focuses on the role an idea plays in 
an adherent’s life, rather than its content.78 However, what 
“religious” really means in a functional sense remains nebulous 
and indefinite.79 Moreover, whether religious beliefs are always 
equivalent to ultimate concerns is another problematic issue with 
this definitional approach. In other words, beliefs that an adherent 
might commonly consider religious may or may not function with 
such universal importance in an individual’s life that a person 
would make immense sacrifices in order to abide by them.80  
Thus, because of the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to define 
religion clearly, lower courts have sought a more workable 
approach for defining religion in the constitutional context.81 A 
pertinent example is Malnak v. Yogi, a landmark decision in the 
Third Circuit in which the court barred the offering of a high 
school course in the Science of Creative Intelligence and 
Transcendental Meditation (SCI/TM) on Establishment Clause 
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grounds.82 The plaintiffs argued that the SCI/TM course was 
religious in nature and therefore barred from public funding.83 
Central to the course was the idea that life is founded in “pure 
creative intelligence.”84 Additionally, the Hindu monk directing 
the course encouraged students to “perceive the full potential of 
their lives” through Transcendental Meditation.85 The practice of 
Transcendental Meditation taught in the course included a 
ceremonial element known as the “puja,” which involved the 
recitation of a “mantra” chosen for each student individually.86 The 
puja also included chanting and making offerings to a deified 
Hindu teacher.87 Despite the defendants’ contention that the 
SCI/TM course was not religious in nature, the Third Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s finding88 that the course was indeed of 
a religious nature.89 Notably, without referring to or setting forth 
any definition of religion, the court simply deemed the SCI/TM 
course as religious and violative of the Establishment Clause.90 
Unsatisfied with the court’s conclusory classification of the 
SCI/TM course as religious, Judge Arlin Adams, in a concurring 
opinion, set out a test for defining religion in the constitutional 
context.91 Although Judge Adams acknowledged Seeger and 
Welsh’s expansion of the definition of religion to include non-
theistic belief systems, Judge Adams also found the ultimate 
concerns and sincerity inquiries to require further development and 
limitation.92 Accordingly, Judge Adams developed a three-factor 
test.93 First, ideas or actions of a religious nature should “address 
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fundamental questions” in the sense expressed in the ultimate 
concerns test in Seeger and Welsh.94 Judge Adams emphasized 
courts’ duty not to determine the “truth or falsity” of supposed 
religions; nonetheless, the test requires the determination of 
whether a belief rises to the level of encompassing “theories of 
man’s nature or his place in the Universe which characterize 
recognized religions.”95  
The next two factors provide limits upon the first. Because a 
particular ultimate concern may be an isolated idea that deals only 
with one or a few aspects of life, the second factor requires that an 
idea be part of a “comprehensive belief-system” to be considered 
religious.96 For example, Judge Adams referred to the Big Bang 
theory as answering an ultimate question, yet failing to encompass 
all aspects of life in a complete system of ultimate truth.97 Lastly, 
the third factor requires the presence of “formal, external, or 
surface signs that may be analogized to accepted religions.”98 For 
example, this element consists of “formal services, ceremonial 
functions, the existence of clergy, structure and organization, 
efforts at propagation, observation of holidays and other similar 
manifestations associated with the traditional religions.”99 
Thus, Judge Adams provided three factors that now compose 
the prevailing test for defining religion. Courts in subsequent cases 
have adopted these factors and scholars have treated them as 
central to the debate regarding the definition of religion.100 For 
example, two years after Malnak, the Third Circuit officially 
adopted Judge Adams’s three-factor test in Africa v. 
Pennsylvania.101 In addition, the Tenth Circuit adopted and 
modified Judge Adams’s test in United States v. Meyers,102 which 
                                                                                                             
 94. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 208 (Adams, J., concurring). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 209. 
 97. Id. at 208–09. 
 98. Id. at 209. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See, e.g., Collier, supra note 79, at 991–97; Clements, supra note 68, at 
552–53; Sandrik, supra note 64, at 568–69. 
 101. 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981) (denying prisoner’s petition for injunction 
requiring state prison authority to provide for special religious dietary needs and 
holding that prisoner’s organization—which required a raw food diet and an 
opposition to all that is wrong, and consisted of no formal hierarchy or 
ceremonies—was not religious, insofar as the organization did not address 
fundamental and ultimate questions, was not comprehensive in nature, and did 
not have external or formal signs characteristic of traditional religions).  
 102. 95 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1996) (setting out five factors for determining 
whether an idea or organization is religious: ultimate ideas, metaphysical beliefs, 
moral or ethical systems, comprehensiveness of beliefs, and accoutrements of 
religion).  




provided the standard for the District Court of New Mexico in 
United States v. Quaintance.103 Furthermore, the parties to the 
Waldorf controversy have relied upon Judge Adams’s concurrence 
in Malnak as an appropriate standard for resolving the Waldorf 
controversy.104 Thus, at the least, Judge Adams’s test is gaining 
popularity as an appropriate way to define religion for the purposes 
of the First Amendment. 
III. DISTILLING THE INTERESTS THAT DRIVE THE DEBATE ABOUT 
THE DEFINITION OF RELIGION 
The Supreme Court’s failure to develop an unambiguous 
constitutional definition of religion signifies an uncommonly 
volatile area of American constitutional law.105 Whereas courts 
have defined other concepts in the Constitution, religion is 
relatively uncharted territory. The varying judicial and scholarly 
opinions suggesting an appropriate method for defining religion 
are rooted in the struggle between competing individual and 
societal interests.106 For example, in most cases involving the 
religion clauses of the Constitution, individual interests like 
freedom of conscience, self-determination, and avoidance of 
psychological trauma are pitted against society’s interests in 
avoiding political discord and unnecessary cost and maintaining a 
separation of church and state.107  
Whereas advocates of a broad definition of religion usually 
focus on the individual concerns at stake, scholars and judges 
seeking to rein in the definition of religion typically do so with the 
interests of ordered liberty and society at large in mind.108 For 
example, when an individual conscientiously objects on the basis 
of a borderline religious belief, he or she has an interest in a broad 
definition of religion that sweeps widely in its ambit of 
protection.109 Conversely, the government may have an interest in 
a narrower definition of religion that allows the state to legislate 
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and enforce laws it views as valuable to society without the 
interference of the Free Exercise Clause.110 
A. Protecting Individual Interests 
Serving as the fountainhead of the modern broadening of the 
definition of religion beyond theism, Torcaso v. Watkins resulted 
in the Supreme Court’s invalidation of a Maryland constitutional 
provision that required state officials to profess a belief in God.111 
Particularly, the Court held that Maryland’s oath requirement 
“unconstitutionally invade[d] the [declining official’s] freedom of 
belief and religion.”112 In other words, the Court’s decision in 
Torcaso explicitly rejected a purely theistic definition of 
religion.113 In doing so, the Court concerned itself with the 
potential “burdens imposed on the free exercise of the faiths of 
nonfavored believers.”114 Indeed, the Court in Torcaso reinforced 
the scholar-supported notion that “[t]he core of the free exercise 
clause is voluntarism—the inviolability of conscience.”115 
Accordingly, the thrust of the Torcaso decision appears to emanate 
from the notion of defending individual citizens from the harmful 
psychological turmoil of having to feign or alter religious beliefs in 
order to avoid punishment or obtain a benefit from the state.116  
Notably, although the Torcaso decision marked the Court’s 
willingness to recognize the important moral and psychological 
interests an individual has in the security of his conscience, it did 
so without having to account for any significant competing state 
                                                                                                             
 110. See discussion infra Part III.B. In a case in which the Establishment 
Clause is central, the interests are reversed. The government may desire a broad 
definition of religion to control religious influence in state affairs, whereas an 
individual entity may seek a narrower definition in order to escape the 
limitations of the Establishment Clause. Id. 
 111. 367 U.S. 488 (1961). At issue in Torcaso was article 37 of the 
Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution: “‘[N]o religious test ought 
ever to be required as a qualification for any office of profit or trust in this State, 
other than a declaration of belief in the existence of God . . . .’” Id. at 489. 
 112. Id. at 496. 
 113. See Note, supra note 77, at 1066. 
 114. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 490. 
 115. See Note, supra note 77, at 1058. 
 116. Clements, supra note 68, at 545; Dwyer, supra note 107, at 970–71; J. 
Morris Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327, 
337 (1969); Gary J. Simson, Endangering Religious Liberty, 84 CAL. L. REV. 
441, 466–67 (1996); Brian M. Murray, Confronting Religion: Veiled Muslim 
Witnesses and the Confrontation Clause, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1743 
(2010). 




interest.117 Rather, the Court struck down an arcane provision of 
the Maryland Constitution that, although originally drafted soon 
after colonists emigrated to “escape religious test oaths and 
declarations” they had faced in Europe,118 was subsequently 
abused by religious majorities to oppress “dissenters from their 
faith.”119 This brief dismissal of the Maryland provision, coupled 
with the glaring absence of any mention of Maryland’s interest in 
upholding the requirement that officials express a belief in God, 
indicates that the Court considered the individual interests at stake 
in the case as prevailing over comparatively minimal, or even non-
existent, legitimate state interests.120 In other words, broadening 
the definition of religion and connoting the break from a line of 
narrow, theistic jurisprudence was relatively easy for the Court in 
Torcaso, in which the state lacked any significant interest in 
enforcing the particular provision. 
However, a few years later in the Seeger and Welsh decisions, 
the Court encountered more formidable societal interests, which 
required a more careful balancing against individual interests.121 
Summarized succinctly, the federal government had an incentive to 
prevent the circumvention of the draft through the abuse of a 
statutory exemption for conscientious objectors.122 Moreover, 
although all governments have a significant interest in ensuring the 
enforcement of laws in general, the federal government in Seeger 
and Welsh had compelling and particularized interests in 
effectively enforcing the law to provide for national security, 
defense, and public order.123 Expressed differently, in Seeger and 
Welsh, the individual interest in avoiding the dilemma of 
disobeying the law or facing “extratemporal consequences” was 
pitted against strong societal interests in maintaining the meaning 
and applicability of law, as well as in providing for public 
safety.124 
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Despite the government’s interest in curtailing the breadth of 
the definition of religion in the Seeger and Welsh cases, the Court 
allowed the conscientious objection, indicating that individual 
interests in freedom of conscience and of religion are to be 
protected as sacred even in the face of important state policies.125 
In turn, the ultimate concerns test was born.126 Accordingly, with 
this precedent in mind, advocates of the psychological interests 
connected with the Free Exercise Clause promote broadly inclusive 
definitions of religion.127 Expanding upon the individual 
psychological and conscience-based concerns that are central to the 
policy behind a broad definition of religion, commentators 
advocating broad definitions emphasize other more particularized 
concerns about morality and fairness, which come under the 
protection of the Free Exercise Clause.128 For example, “the cost to 
a principled individual of failing to do his moral duty is generally 
severe, in terms of supernatural sanction or the loss of moral self-
respect.”129 Additionally, broad definitions also aim to protect 
interests in privacy, independence, self-expression, and 
maintaining the integrity of religion against state interference.130 
B. Protecting Societal Interests 
The Supreme Court’s development of the ultimate concerns 
test in Seeger and Welsh, which provided a distinctly broad 
definition of religion, has drawn the critical eye of judges and 
commentators.131 The expansive ultimate concerns approach 
promulgated in Seeger and Welsh has been criticized as useless, 
subject to abuse, limitless, and generally unworkable.132 These 
criticisms tend to relate to society’s countervailing interests in 
religion clause cases, particularly in avoiding the circumvention of 
generally applicable laws by individuals who are empowered to 
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define religion themselves.133 Permitting individuals to define 
religion themselves arguably allows the fox to guard the henhouse, 
threatening to render the religion clauses objectively 
meaningless.134 Furthermore, the ultimate concerns test imposes an 
immense burden upon the state in sifting the fraudulent abusers 
from the sincere believers.135  
Correspondingly, post-Seeger and post-Welsh, allowing 
individuals and organizations to be laws unto themselves indicates 
a need to limit the ultimate concerns test. For example, Judge 
Adams’s concurrence in Malnak deftly limited the apparent 
breadth of the Torcaso, Seeger, and Welsh notions of religion by 
characterizing religious ideas as part of a “comprehensive belief 
system laying a claim to ultimate truth and supported by a formal 
group with religious trappings.”136 Judge Adams’s motivation to 
give tangible limits to the definition of religion further manifested 
itself in the opinion he authored for Africa v. Pennsylvania, in 
which the Third Circuit officially adopted Judge Adams’s three-
part test.137 
By the same token, other societal concerns distinct from the 
state’s interest in preventing the circumvention of the law 
undergird jurisprudence and scholarly commentary partial to a 
more limited definition of religion. One prominent societal concern 
hinges upon the perceived overinclusiveness of the ultimate 
concerns test: the test—interpreted at its broadest application—
threatens to invalidate any legislation with a humanitarian 
                                                                                                             
 133. Blutman, supra note 132; see also Empl. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990) (holding that neutral laws of general applicability do not violate the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment). 
 134. Blutman, supra note 132. However, fears of fraud and abuse are 
arguably overdrawn because religious ideas are of such importance that 
individuals will not lie about them in a way that would cheapen ideas central to 
their lives. Note, supra note 77, at 1081–82. Moreover, the sincerity test is 
arguably competent to identify fraud efficiently. Id. See also Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1972) ( “A way of life, however virtuous and 
admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of 
education if it is based on purely secular considerations; to have the protection 
of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief. Although 
a determination of what is a ‘religious’ belief or practice entitled to 
constitutional protection may present a most delicate question, the very concept 
of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on 
matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests.”).  
 135. Clark, supra note 116, at 335. 
 136. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 212 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., 
concurring). In other words, Judge Adams set out a three-part test encompassing 
ultimate concerns, comprehensiveness, and external signs characteristic of 
accepted religions. Id. at 208–09. 
 137. 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 1981). 




objective as an establishment of religion.138 From a broader social 
perspective, government has a strong interest in avoiding excessive 
cost and intense political discord, which prevent the state from 
handling issues more pressing than the mediation of religious 
controversies under either the Free Exercise Clause or 
Establishment Clause.139 
C. Dual Versus Unitary Definitional Approaches 
Noting the competing interests and approaches for defining 
religion, Judge Adams’s concurrence in Malnak also calls attention 
to the tug-of-war between the different values associated with the 
Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. Judge Adams 
acknowledges but dismisses the scholarly promotion of a dual 
definition of religion—a different definition for each clause that is 
sensitive to the balance of competing values.140 Particularly, a dual 
definitional method would impose a broad definition for the Free 
Exercise Clause to protect the array of individual interests, whereas 
a narrow definition would attach to the Establishment Clause for 
the protection of societal interests.141 Although this approach 
purports to resolve the tension between the Free Exercise Clause 
and the Establishment Clause, it is susceptible to criticism that the 
language of the First Amendment requires the adoption of a unitary 
definition of religion.142 Furthermore, with a dual definitional 
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approach, particularly positioned individuals or organizations 
would receive disparate treatment under each religion clause. For 
example, a group might be considered religious under the Free 
Exercise Clause but not under the Establishment Clause, allowing 
it to garner the benefits but avoid the restrictions the Constitution 
applies to religions.143  
Ultimately, the struggle to fill the definitional void for religion 
in the constitutional context is characterized by the broad and the 
narrow, the individual and the societal, the unitary and the dual. 
The different values at stake drive the debate: individual interests 
in preserving freedom of conscience and expression, avoiding 
psychological turmoil, maintaining the integrity of religion, 
avoiding punishment or detriment at the hands of the state, and 
fulfilling moral duties are pitted against societal interests in 
preventing the circumvention of the law, maintaining a separation 
between church and state, avoiding excessive expense in delicate 
religious controversies like the Waldorf scenario, and preserving 
useful legislation from attacks on religious grounds.144 In the 
context of this struggle, the Waldorf dispute provides an 
opportunity for courts to rethink the current method for defining 
religion, particularly through a close examination of the interests, 
questions, and challenges that the Waldorf scenario presents. 
IV. FRAMING THE INTERESTS AT STAKE IN THE WALDORF 
PARADIGM 
A. Unearthing a Hidden Set of Interests 
The Waldorf situation, which arises under the Establishment 
Clause in the educational context, defies the typically observed 
balance of interests, in which an individual entity prefers a broad 
definition of religion, and the government prefers a narrower 
approach.145 In fact, in the Waldorf scenario, the desired approach 
for both sides is reversed—with the individual interests of Waldorf 
supporters better served by a narrow definition of religion and the 
government’s interests protected by a broad definition.146 Although 
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rarely examined as central to an Establishment Clause case in the 
educational context, the reasons for an individual’s preference for a 
narrow definition and the government’s preference for a broad 
definition have always existed latently when an educational 
program or practice faces an Establishment Clause challenge.147  
Nonetheless, because Establishment Clause cases in the 
educational context have commonly involved groups, practices, or 
symbols that are clearly religious—such that their religious nature 
is beyond debate—these cases have not addressed the definition of 
religion or the interests relevant thereto.148 That is to say, no 
clearly established religious defendant has been able to argue 
sincerely that it is not religious for the purposes of the 
Establishment Clause.149 In the Waldorf scenario, however, 
Waldorf supporters and anthroposophists are not like clearly 
established religious groups and can make the argument that they 
are not religious in nature. For example, Waldorf supporters might 
assert that the celebrations of Michaelmas and the Advent Spiral 
are part of a spiritual-educational approach that goes beyond 
religion, unlike a traditional Christian school paradigm that has a 
clearly religious agenda.150 Thus, anthroposophists and Waldorf 
supporters seek a narrower definition of religion, deny religiosity, 
and avoid the limitations of the Establishment Clause.  
Because a Waldorf-like defendant has the legitimate 
opportunity to deny its own religiosity under the Establishment 
Clause, and because the state has significant interests in a dispute 
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like the Waldorf scenario, a court should have the authority to 
define a group or individual as religious, even if the group or 
individual denies its religiosity. Moreover, such judicial authority 
is particularly important in light of the increased probability of 
Waldorf-like disputes arising in the future.151 In light of the 
implications of the Waldorf scenario, two related policy arguments 
favor the court’s authority to impose a religious label on a 
denier.152  
B. Waiver of Religious Interests 
The first argument is relatively uncomplicated, although 
controversial: in the Waldorf situation, wherein an entity denies its 
religiosity, such a denial serves as a waiver of any religious rights 
or interests normally contemplated in a religion clause case. In 
other words, a denial of religious status may be viewed as a waiver 
of the benefits of a religious classification.153 Additionally, in spite 
of this waiver of religious interests, a court may nonetheless label 
an entity as religious in light of society’s heightened countervailing 
interests in preventing indoctrination, fraud, and a mixing of 
church and state.154 The rationale is that individual religious 
interests no longer stand in opposition to the state’s powerful 
interests.155 This view is consistent with the idea that individuals or 
groups should not be able to self-define for the purposes of the 
law, even if, as in this type of case, religiosity is not purported but 
instead denied.156  
The waiver argument leads to a peculiar result, however. 
Indeed, it allows the denier of religiosity to create a dual definition 
of religion by its own accord, albeit the complete opposite of what 
advocates of a dual definition suggest.157 Whereas the literature 
focuses on a narrow definition for the Establishment Clause and a 
broad definition for the Free Exercise Clause,158 this “waiver” 
approach results in a group falling outside of the definition of 
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religion for the purposes of the Free Exercise Clause but inside the 
definition for the purposes of the Establishment Clause. 
Admittedly, this result is vulnerable to the criticism that the 
government cannot “have its cake and eat it, too.” If a court 
classifies a group or individual as religious, it should not only take 
into account government and societal interests that exist in a 
religious context, but, in fairness, it should also consider the 
interests a group or individual necessarily has as a religious entity. 
In other words, if a court determines that a group or individual is 
religious against that entity’s will, the court should recognize both 
the limitations and benefits that result from a religious 
characterization.159 
Moreover, the waiver view is open to the criticism that it 
allows the state to take unfair advantage of the subtle differences 
between the commonly understood meaning of religion and the 
legal definition of religion, which, in its current state, is a broader 
concept than the former.160 For example, the Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
who claim that all religion is “wrong,” “a snare,” and “a racket,”161 
would likely qualify as constitutionally religious under the 
prevailing judicial tests and scholarly suggestions for defining 
religion.162 Essentially, in a situation like the Waldorf controversy, 
the waiver argument allows the state to apply the broader legal 
definition in the Establishment Clause context and the narrower 
operational definition in the free exercise context—both for the 
state’s own advantage.163  
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C. Balancing Individual and Societal Interests 
Notwithstanding the waiver argument’s potential weaknesses, a 
second argument demonstrates the superiority of the state’s 
interests over the interests of the anthroposophists and Waldorf 
supporters in the current controversy. It initially proceeds by 
indicating the particular societal interests at stake and weighs them 
against the comparatively inferior, less compelling individual 
interests of the Waldorf schools. 
In a typical conscientious objection claim, the objector’s 
interest in individual freedom and psychological well-being is 
usually pitted against the state’s comparably formidable interest in 
enforcing whichever law is alleged to violate the Free Exercise 
Clause. In such a case, the state aims, inter alia, to guard against 
fraudulent adherents to a religion in order to prevent abuse of the 
Free Exercise Clause and circumvention of the law.164 Likewise, in 
the Waldorf situation, the government has a significant interest in 
preventing fraudulent denials of religiosity in order to prevent 
circumvention of the Establishment Clause.165  
Nonetheless, there is a key difference between these two 
situations, with respect to the magnitude of the individual interests 
at stake. In the conscientious objection fact pattern, the state’s 
interests are at odds with formidable individual interests that are of 
arguably equal or greater strength.166 Conversely, in a Waldorf-like 
fact pattern there exist compelling societal concerns against which 
no counterbalancing individual interests of comparable magnitude 
emerge.167  
Critical among the state’s concerns is preventing the 
fraudulent—or at least injurious—circumvention of the 
Establishment Clause by a religious group that claims it is not 
religious.168 Allowing such a group to avoid an Establishment 
Clause challenge opens the door to state-funded religious 
indoctrination in an educational setting, the blurring of the line 
between church and state, and the incitement of political discord like 
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the Waldorf controversy.169 The primary thrust of this interest-
balancing argument rests on a modification of the notion that 
allowing individuals to be a law unto themselves threatens to render 
the Free Exercise Clause limitless.170 In the Waldorf situation, 
however, it is the Establishment Clause that is at risk of superfluity 
if a group is granted the power to define itself legally as non-
religious.171 Furthermore, the state has an interest in avoiding costs 
and efficiently monitoring borderline cases like the Waldorf dispute 
to prevent Establishment Clause violations from occurring.172  
In sum, the state and the society it represents have powerful 
interests under the Establishment Clause in thoroughly and fairly 
vetting the veracity of the claim that public Waldorf schools are 
not religious in nature. Necessarily, these interests weigh in favor 
of allowing judicial discretion to determine whether entities like 
Waldorf schools are religious, despite their contentions to the 
contrary.  
On the other side of the interests equation, however, free 
exercise concerns for fairness to the individual, freedom of 
conscience, and the avoidance of psychological harm are not 
central to the debate in the Waldorf situation. The moral dilemma 
facing an individual entity that must choose between following the 
law or its religion is not present in the Waldorf paradigm, wherein 
religious nature is explicitly disavowed.173 Assuredly, there is no 
danger of duress upon one’s conscience, against which the Free 
Exercise Clause protects. Moreover, to declare that there exists a 
fundamental right to receive public funding for a particular 
teaching method is questionable at best.174 Adherents to 
anthroposophy are not at risk of undue governmental interference 
with the practice of their spiritual philosophy either. Indeed, 
defining anthroposophy as a religion under the Establishment 
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Clause would remove only Waldorf schools’ eligibility for public 
funding.175 
To be sure, important individual interests are at stake in a 
Waldorf fact pattern, but they do not rise to the level of society’s 
interests in upholding the Establishment Clause. For example, 
Waldorf schools maintain concerns about self-determination, self-
definition, and the ability to educate children in a manner that 
many believe is beneficial to students’ minds, bodies, and 
spirits.176 Moreover, Waldorf schools may also have a strong 
interest in avoiding the government-sanctioned cheapening of their 
teaching methods through a religious classification.177 In other 
words, Waldorf supporters insist that the allegedly religious 
characteristics of the Waldorf method are either historical or purely 
spiritual in nature.178 A religious label may undercut Waldorf 
supporters’ apparently firm belief in neutrality and secularity as 
touchstones of Waldorf education’s quality.179 Nonetheless, in this 
scenario, an allegedly religious entity’s values do not come under 
the special protection of the Free Exercise Clause and are non-
issues in the Waldorf paradigm. Thus, in short, a court should have 
the power to define ideas and systems like anthroposophy and 
Waldorf schools as religious in light of compelling societal 
concerns, despite a denial to the contrary.  
V. ADOPTING A BROAD, UNITARY DEFINITION OF RELIGION 
The societal interests at stake in the Waldorf controversy tip 
the scales in the government’s favor, preventing anthroposophists 
from legally defining themselves as non-religious and instead 
demanding the recognition of a judge’s capability to define 
anthroposophy as religious under appropriate circumstances. How 
courts should define religion in light of these interests, however, is 
a different issue. The balance of interests in the Waldorf 
controversy provides critical insight into solving this issue and 
suggests a new framework for defining religion. Moreover, the 
Waldorf situation’s relevance to an increasingly pluralistic society 
demonstrates a need for a definition of religion that differs in 
dimension from the currently prevailing Malnak test.180 In light of 
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these considerations, a broad, inclusive definition, if applied 
unitarily and with proper limitation, fairly and symmetrically 
protects individual and societal values. Specifically, this unitary 
definition should avoid a “comprehensiveness” requirement and 
should incorporate a non-determinative “duties of conscience” 
requirement as well as a non-determinative “external signs” 
requirement.  
A. Equity of a Unitary Approach 
Coupled with the increasing likelihood of Waldorf-like 
scenarios in the future, the powerful societal interests at stake in 
the Waldorf paradigm bolster the argument for a broad, unitary 
definition of religion.181 Whereas the promotion of an expansive 
definition is usually premised on achieving protection of individual 
interests, a broad, unitary definition of religion also prevents 
circumvention of the wall between church and state in Waldorf-
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like situations, providing clarity for the meaning of the 
Establishment Clause.182  
In other words, whereas less-known religious groups are 
protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Waldorf situation 
indicates a related need to include these groups in the ambit of the 
Establishment Clause. This way, symmetry is achieved between 
both religion clauses, and a religion receives equal treatment in 
both contexts. Moreover, the Establishment Clause’s historically 
societal objectives are best achieved under a broad definition of 
religion that serves the needs of a religiously pluralistic society.183 
Ultimately, the existence and probable proliferation of Waldorf-
like controversies reinforce the argument for a broad, inclusive 
definition of religion. 
B. Crafting a Workable Definition of Religion 
1. Dropping Malnak’s “Comprehensiveness” Requirement 
Judge Adams was aware of the unusual scheme of interests at 
issue in Malnak and recognized the importance of developing and 
applying an expansive yet prudently limited definition of 
religion.184 In turn, Judge Adams crafted the three-part ultimate 
concerns, comprehensiveness, and external characteristics test.185 
Nonetheless, Judge Adams’s test does not escape criticism and 
should be modified in order to develop a workable definition of 
religion that reflects the needs and characteristics of modern 
American society.186 
Judge Adams’s approach is susceptible to the criticism that 
comprehensiveness is not a necessary component of a religion.187 
Indeed, the comprehensiveness component classifies as non-
religious “a person who worships the sun” or a pantheist, “whose 
belief system consists simply of the notion that God exists solely in 
nature, and whose beliefs guide him to lead a pure and natural 
life.”188 These examples would likely be considered religious from 
a common, everyday perspective; in turn, the broader definition 
that Judge Adams claims to adopt should not exclude them.189 In 
addition, this element of the three-part test is inherently vague, 
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insofar as the concept of comprehensiveness may vary 
significantly among individuals.190 Moreover, persons not 
articulate enough to convey the comprehensiveness of their ideas 
might become objects of unfair discrimination in court.191  
Waldorf education provides another example of the 
arbitrariness of the comprehensiveness standard.192 Although 
anthroposophy and Waldorf education may be considered 
comprehensive under Judge Adams’s approach, in light of their 
mental, spiritual, and physical focuses, they may instead be 
considered to fall below the comprehensiveness threshold.193 To be 
sure, anthroposophy and Waldorf education arguably center merely 
on health issues, albeit mental, physical, and spiritual health.194 
Nonetheless, PLANS makes other legitimate arguments beyond 
comprehensiveness that advocate for a finding of religiosity, 
emphasizing anthroposophy’s attention to theistic and ultimate 
concerns and its exhibition of formal external signs of a religious 
character.195 Accordingly, because it is both arbitrary and 
unnecessary, the comprehensiveness requirement should be 
eliminated from the test.  
2. Modifying “Ultimate Concerns” to Reflect “Duties of 
Conscience” 
In addition to eliminating the comprehensiveness requirement, 
a modification of the first Malnak factor to reflect “duties of 
conscience” will more accurately capture the role of religion in an 
individual’s life, as well as in society.196 For example, in Seeger 
and Welsh, the Supreme Court intended for the ultimate concerns 
test to express the functional role of religion in an adherent’s life—
the place an idea holds, rather than its content.197 The Court 
required that a claimant exhibit a “belief that is sincere and 
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meaningful [and] occupies a place in the life of its possessor 
parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who 
clearly qualifies for the exemption.”198 Nonetheless, without 
actually clarifying the function of religious belief in the life of a 
follower of a recognized religion, this definition falls short of 
providing a usable approach.199  
Furthermore, the subset of ideas that may qualify as ultimate 
concerns—for example, a deep-seated conviction relating to a 
particular political philosophy—is not necessarily consistent with 
the class of ideas the religion clauses aim to address.200 Assuredly, 
the Court’s primary concern in Seeger and Welsh was the 
inviolability of conscience.201 The Court aimed to prevent the 
intense psychological turmoil an adherent faces when forced to 
choose between obeying the law or his conscience—not when 
facing a conflict between the law and any question of great 
meaning.202 Not all ultimate concerns necessarily qualify as 
matters of conscience.203  
Rather than labor with the inherent vagueness of the ultimate 
concerns test as it stands, courts should focus on ideas that impart 
to believers a duty of conscience—“a compelling sense of devotion 
and duty.”204 Stated differently, duties of conscience would 
incorporate Judge Adams’s notions of “the meaning of life and 
death, man’s role in the Universe, and the proper moral code of 
right and wrong,”205 while also achieving consistency with the 
spirit of the Court’s conscience-oriented interpretation of the First 
Amendment’s aims.206 In a more narrowly tailored fashion than the 
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ultimate concerns test, such a definition protects the inviolability of 
conscience that the Seeger and Welsh Courts aimed to preserve.207 
Moreover, requiring ideas of questionable religious nature to relate 
to duties of conscience in order to be considered constitutionally 
religious is a test that more accurately captures the role that easily 
recognized, clearly religious ideas play in the lives of individuals 
and in society.  
3. Maintaining the “External Signs and Formalities” 
Requirement 
Third, a useful yet non-determinative factor involves “formal, 
external, or surface signs that may be analogized to accepted 
religions.”208 In other words, rituals, hierarchies, holy texts, 
ceremonial apparel, and other externally observable indications are 
useful analogical tools for identifying religious character, even 
though they are not necessary to such a finding.209 This factor 
allows courts to consider and apply everyday, commonplace 
notions of religion as it occurs in society.210  
CONCLUSION 
The Waldorf dispute provides a glimpse into the likely 
future—a changing American religious and educational landscape, 
which will give rise to cases that will inevitably call into question 
the meaning and aims of the religion clauses of the Constitution.211 
Ultimately, the particular facts of the Waldorf controversy—
Waldorf supporters’ insistence that the system’s roots in 
anthroposophy and its teaching methods are spiritual yet non-
religious212—not only demonstrate significant state interests at 
stake in defining religion but also suggest that courts in the future 
should be able to apply a religious label to an entity in spite of its 
denial of religiosity.213 In turn, the prevailing societal interests in 
the Waldorf scenario add to the evidence supporting American 
society’s need for a broad, unitary definition of religion—one that 
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gives adequate meaning and scope to both the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses.  
In addition to maintaining an “external signs” factor, the 
subtraction of Judge Adams’s “comprehensiveness” requirement 
and the modification of the notion of ultimate concerns to reflect 
“duties of conscience” allow for the broad protection of the 
interests associated with both religion clauses.214 Such a definition 
of religion also reflects the more commonly understood role of 
religion in American society and uses reasonable limits to protect 
against overinclusion. Lastly, this definitional approach allows for 
flexibility in a continuously pluralizing society, providing a fair, 
sufficiently inclusive playing field for individuals and groups that 




                                                                                                             
 214. The greatest significance of the Waldorf dispute does not lie in its 
resolution; rather, the scenario more importantly foretells the manifestation of 
similar factual situations in the future and emphasizes the need for a workable 
definition of religion. Nonetheless, this author believes that, under the newly 
proposed definition of religion, Waldorf schools and anthroposophy would 
potentially earn religious classifications. Without having to meet a 
comprehensiveness requirement, Waldorf schools and anthroposophy would 
fulfill the “duties of conscience” factor because of the arguably moral 
obligations that they impose upon an adherent’s conscience: a mission to avoid 
profound misunderstandings and anti-social attitudes in order to become more 
fully human. Moreover, the globally connected network of anthroposophy-based 
organizations and the ritualistic, ceremonial characteristics of parts of Waldorf 
education contribute to the external signs factor of the proposed test. 
Nonetheless, a legitimate counterargument—which goes beyond the scope of 
this paper—lies in the contention that strong moral suggestions are not 
equivalent to imperative moral duties. Regardless of any preliminary assertions, 
however, determining religiosity under the proposed test would ultimately 
require a trier of fact to examine in detail the totality of relevant evidence. 
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